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The Great Depression? Challenging the Periodization of 
French Business History in the Interwar Period 
Florence Brachet Champsaur and Ludovic Cailluet 
In this essay we aim to demonstrate that economic and business 
historians‘ tendency to use moments of severe economic 
turbulence as turning points does not always fit with a periodiza-
tion based on corporate change. In fact, our essay shows that the 
economic downturn of the early 1930s did not impact all 
companies‘ long-term strategies the same way and that it 
sometimes fostered management innovations or helped to 
reinforce nascent ideas. To illustrate our point we have chosen to 
look at two companies that, despite the Great Depression, 
developed new administrative methods and marketing 
innovations. They acted not only in a defensive mode but also to 
prepare for better times. The cases were deliberately taken from 
very different sectors. The first deals with heavy industry, using 
the metallurgy and chemicals company AFC-Pechiney; the second 
considers the family-owned and -managed retail group Galeries 
Lafayette. 
 
Major economic crises have an obvious impact on businesses, influencing 
markets, prices, and ultimately the generation and allocation of resources 
by firms. From a managerial point of view, however, economic cycles 
might not be the only relevant framework to explain decision-making 
processes and cycles of managerial innovation. In this essay we question 
the synchronization between the chronology of  economic history and the 
chronology of business history from the focal point of the firm and its 
leaders. 
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The construct of ―crisis‖ itself has evolved greatly since the inception 
of the word in philosophy and politics. With Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels, ―crisis‖ switched from a purely political to an economic term. 
During the nineteenth and twentieth century, the term, according to 
intellectual historian Reinhart Kosseleck, became a catchword with little 
technical or precise meaning.1 Public perceptions of economic crisis have 
also evolved very differently over time. Economic crises brought despair 
and poverty and at the same time—in a Darwinian view—were also 
considered a ―chronic process of selection‖ and ―transitional phases in the 
path to progress.‖ There was also for Marxists the promise of a revolution 
to come.2  Historians themselves have used ―crisis‖ as a key concept to 
―characterize epochs or structures.‖3 Since the late nineteenth century 
crises have been literally understood as ―decisive‖ moments in history 
when choices are or are not made by society. It is important to notice that 
the ―decisiveness‖ in the evaluation of the impact or span of the event or 
process is also—to some extent—a function of the actor‘s perceptions.4   
 
The Case for Cases 
Because of its impact on the twentieth century, the Great Depression has 
inspired thousands of books and articles. Economists and historians have 
been at work since the early 1930s to understand the event. In the French 
case, several works have also been devoted to ―la crise de 1929.‖5 Economic 
historians have looked at the causes of the Depression, its effects and long-
term consequences. Business historians, because they are more inclined to 
case studies and monographs at firm or industry levels, have not yet 
developed a grand synthesis on the impact of 1929 in France. Compared to 
economic history or macroeconomics, business history appears to generate 
limited or fractional insights, a circumstance viewed as a weakness by 
many social scientists and also by fellow historians. However, in this essay, 
we want to make a case for cases. In looking at two separate stories 
concerned with completely unrelated firms, we intend to understand the 
inner workings of organizations in times of crisis. Cases, when they 
provide counterexamples to macroeconomic phenomena elsewhere 
measured by statistical methods, are important. 
                                                   
1 Reinhart Koselleck, ―Crisis,‘‘ Journal of the History of Ideas 67 (April 2006): 
357-400, at 397 (translated from ‗‗Krise‘‘ in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: 
Historisches Lexicon zurpolitisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland , ed. Otto 
Brunner, Werner Konze, and Reinhart Koselleck, 8 vols. [Stuttgart, 1972-1997], 
3: 617-50). 
2 Ibid., 393. 
3 Ibid., 399. 
4 Laurent Commaille, ed., Entreprises et crises économiques au 20ème siècle 
(Metz, 2009), 4. 
5 For the most recent French synthesis, see Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, La crise de 
1929 (Paris, 2009), 128. 
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We also tackle the perceptions of the actors regarding the situation 
surrounding them, exclusive of sector specificities. Finally, we have also 
chosen to look at hard and soft innovations, invisible technologies, and 
long-term projects that started before the Great Depression and endured 
beyond it. 
 
Perceptions 
At the risk of anachronism, some scholars analyze the past as if the 
generation they write about should have acted as if it were aware of living 
through a specific historical phenomenon. Most educated people in France 
knew for certain by 1931-1932 that their country was facing an economic 
downturn, but none knew for how long and by what exact causes—still a 
debated issue seventy-five years later.6 In France, many industrialists had 
a disproportionately optimistic perception of the economic situation, at 
least until 1931. During the Galeries Lafayette annual shareholders‘ 
meeting that took place on the November 23, 1929, the managers 
announced the beginning of an important extension of the Parisian shop 
and declared, ―c‘est donc en toute sécurité qu‘il nous est permis 
d‘envisager l‘avenir‖ (we can safely look forward to the future). One year 
later, steelmakers of ―Les forges et Aciéries du Nord et de l‘Est,‖ while 
taking stock of the general economic crisis, were evaluating positively their 
own situation.7 On the other hand, Louis Marlio, Pechiney‘s vice-chairman 
declared in September 1927 that, in light of the ―persistent crisis,‖ the 
development of new production capacity might be delayed.8 The first 
mention of ―crisis‖ during the Great Depression in Pechiney‘s executive 
committee minutes dates from February 1930. In a rather formal manner 
the two executive vice-presidents made clear that they wanted to fight 
against the mentality of liberal spending that seemed to have pervaded the 
company during the ―prosperity years.‖ They declared that, as of ―now,‖ 
appropriations would be approved only when evidence could be given of a 
demonstrated improvement or savings.9 These examples show that in the 
years immediately before and after 1929, ―crisis‖ was used in a different 
meaning depending on the perception of the environment. The concept 
was also instrumentalized to achieve managerial objectives and to install 
new procedures and cultural change. 
 In his analysis of the early perception (or lack thereof) of the 
Depression in traditional industries, Laurent Commaille posits that there 
                                                   
6 Hautcoeur, La crise de 1929, 6. 
7 Laurent Commaille, ―La tête dans le sable—perception de la crise économique 
au début des années 30 dans les entreprises des secteurs traditionnels en 
France,‖ in Commaille, ed., Entreprises et crises économiques, 74. 
8 Pechiney, executive committee minutes, 26 Sept. 1927, Archives Pechiney. 
9 Ibid.  
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are indeed two separate levels of analysis.10 On the one hand, there is a 
large production of discourse generated outside the firm—in the press, by 
academia, and politicians. On the other hand, there is the perception at the 
company level of the firm‘s own situation based on proprietary 
information, industry sources, and past exposure to economic downturns. 
Business historians are well equipped to analyze the firms‘ perceptions 
through minutes of meetings and internal correspondence. They should be 
able to generalize their findings into a specific periodization effort, focused 
on the internal decision-making processes at firm level. 
 
The Issue of Periodization 
As Thomas Carlyle wrote in his essay ―On History‖ in 1830:  
Our clock strikes when there is a change from hour to hour; but no 
hammer in the horologe of time peals through the universe when 
there is a change from Era to Era. Men understand not what is 
among their hands; as calmness is the characteristic of strength, so 
the weightiest causes may be most silent.11 
Despite this early warning, there is a general agreement on periodization 
among most historians—political, social, economic, and business alike. 
This is the issue and the contradiction that all historians have to face, as 
Marc Bloch noted: ―real time is in essence a continuum and at the same 
time perpetual change.‖12 
The twentieth century is organized in most of our textbooks and 
articles according to the conventional divide including the two world wars 
and the pre- and post-1929 periods. Specialized works offer more sophis-
tication, but for the sake of a common language, we tend to agree on such 
divisions.13 Nevertheless, one can question how relevant the standard 
divisions are to the inner workings and analysis of company decision 
making over the 1920s and the 1930s. This is what we intend to analyze in 
the following cases. 
Cases for innovation in managerial practices 
The scientific management movement as a method for the modernization 
of industry provides an interesting platform for analyzing the fate of 
innovation in a period of economic crisis. In her seminal book, Aimée 
Moutet considers that there were two waves of rationalization among 
                                                   
10 Commaille, ―La tête dans le sable,‖ 61. 
11 Cited by Lawrence L. Besserman, The Challenge of Periodization: Old Para-
digms and New Perspectives (London, 1996), xi. 
12 Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester, England, 1992), 24. 
13 For example: the periodization in four phases of the Depression in France 
proposed by Daniel Lefeuvre, ―Les lumières de la crise : Les entreprises françaises 
dans la dépression des années 1930,‖ Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire 52 
(1996): 31-40. 
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French enterprises.14 In a first period—roughly the 1920s—several 
engineers enthusiastically joined the Taylorist movement and tried to 
apply its principles in plants and offices. After 1930, Moutet explains,  
industrialists changed their view on scientific management and adopted 
―une rationalisation de crise,‖ or a crisis-specific effort toward scientific 
management that included aggressive cost-cutting policies. This certainly 
needs to be integrated into a larger wave of innovations that took place in 
French companies during the interwar period, when the rationalization 
movement used the crisis context to push forward already nascent 
initiatives. 
Differences 
We want to look at the cases of two different companies and their long-
term strategies within changing economic conditions. The two companies 
we have chosen are very different in nature but still have some elements in 
common. Pechiney (Compagnie des produits chimiques et électro-
métallurgiques d‘Alais, Froges et Camargue, or AFC-Pechiney), founded in 
1855, was active in the period studied in chemicals and electrometallurgy. 
It is a vertically integrated group with mining interests, salt marsh, and 
other related assets making it a diversified enterprise. The company is also 
an electrical energy producer with interests in dams, stations, and power 
transportation serving mostly its industrial plants but also external clients. 
Publicly listed at the Paris stock exchange since 1921, AFC-Pechiney was 
born of a merger of the main French aluminum industrialists.15 The 
stockholders of the company originally represented founding families and 
related interests, but their influence was diluted with the growth of the 
company during the first years of the twentieth century. In the late 1920s, 
a few industrial groups were represented on the board of directors. After 
the 1921 merger, they effectively chose the new executive team, because 
there was no dominant shareholder able to impose choices on the salaried 
managers forming the executive team.16 The nonferrous metals industry is 
largely organized through various cartels at the international and national 
levels. Competition in the aluminum and, to a lesser extent, the chemical 
industries was thus partly ―domesticated,‖ at least until after the Second 
World War.17 
                                                   
14 Aimée Moutet, Les logiques de l’entreprise: la rationalisation dans l’industrie 
française de l’entre-deux-guerres (Paris, 1997), 495. 
15 See Ludovic Cailluet, ―Stratégies, structure d‘organisation et pratiques de 
gestion chez Pechiney des années 1880 à 1971‖ (Ph.D. diss., Lyon II University, 
1995). 
16 Ludovic Cailluet, ―Hiérarchies managériales chez Pechiney (1880-1960): 
Chandler en pays alpin?‖ in Des barrages, de usines et des hommes, ed. Herve 
Joly et al. (Grenoble, 2002), 135-56. 
17 See Donald H. Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1937), and Florence Hachez, L’Aluminium Français, 
l’invention d’un marché, 1911-1983 (Paris, 1999). 
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Galeries Lafayette had developed since its incorporation in 1893 from 
the department store business into an integrated textile and retail group. 
The company was formed by two cousins, Théophile Bader and Alphonse 
Kahn, whose Jewish families had emigrated from Alsace, a French 
territory occupied by Germany after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. 
Bader and Kahn started in business with a novelty shop near the Opéra in 
Paris. Aux Galeries Lafayette was the last major department store founded 
in Paris. When the store opened for business on a very small sales area, 
well-established competitors such as Le Bon Marché or their next-door 
neighbor Le Printemps had been set up thirty to forty years before. In 
1899, they transformed their partnership into a limited liability company 
and raised money to expand their businesses into full-scale department 
stores before going public.  Between 1899 and 1914, the group‘s annual 
turnover increased twenty-two–fold.18 As in the case of the aluminum 
industry, department stores used cartels to limit the adverse effects of 
competition. Despite their apparent fierce rivalry in Paris around the 
Opéra area, Galeries Lafayette and archrival Le Printemps agreed at least 
since 1941 not to open a new outlet where one of the companies already 
had an existing department store. 
Galeries Lafayette opened department stores in the largest towns of 
France and integrated vertically with textile factories in the 1910s.19 From 
the 1920s onward, the sons-in-law of the two founders entered the group 
in managerial positions, forming the second generation of family leaders. 
They participated in the internationalization of activities with openings 
and alliances in Europe and North Africa. 
If there are differences in size and the nature of their business, 
especially in terms of capital intensity and ownership, there are also 
similarities. Pechiney and Galeries Lafayette were in their respective 
sectors major players at national or international levels. Both companies 
and management teams were operating in an environment of limited 
shareholder pressure toward short-term profitability and high dividends. 
Management teams were very stable in both cases, though their stabilities 
derived from different sources. 
Despite being listed on the stock exchange, Galeries Lafayette was 
(and still is in 2010) to some extent a family-controlled and -managed 
company with in-laws involved in the executive teams. At Pechiney, the 
stability of the management was based on educational networks. Most of 
the executives were alumni of the École Polytechnique, an élite 
engineering school. On top of their training credentials, all but a few had 
                                                   
18 Florence Brachet Champsaur, ―Aux Galeries Lafayette, 1893-1919: Naissance 
d‘un leader de la distribution dans le secteur de la mode‖ (Master‘s thesis, 
EHESS, 2005). 
19 Le siècle des Galeries Lafayette, 1896-1996, Les éditions stratégiques (1996), 6. 
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served in the public sector and developed excellent networks of 
government contacts before joining the company.20 
 
Long-term strategizing vs. short-term anti-crisis policies? 
Pechiney and Galeries Lafayette did not confuse their long-term strategy 
with the concerns originating from the general economic situation. They 
both developed during the 1920s at a fast pace, certainly benefiting from a 
generally positive economic context. They also took advantage of long-
term trends in society and the changing patterns of consumption. Both 
companies took part in new forms of production and distribution and 
technological advances. Even the Depression, with its very sharp decline in 
terms of macroeconomic indicators, was not a complete black hole for 
many French companies of the time. Daniel Lefeuvre has shown that the 
total assets of the largest French companies increased during the 
Depression. While the GDP was decreasing by 16 percent between 1929 
and 1938, the annual growth of the ―wealth‖ of large companies, measured 
using companies‘ annual balance sheets (in constant Francs), reached 
almost 3 percent.21 In Galeries Lafayette‘s annual balance sheet, assets 
continued to grow until August 1933. Despite the Depression and the fall 
in turnover after 1930, managers went on investing in real estate, carrying 
out a growth in fixed assets.22 
Pechiney: A Science- and Innovation-Based Company Thriving 
on New Technologies 
Pechiney, a major nonferrous metal producer and manufacturer, 
encouraged new applications of light metals in electrical equipment (as a 
substitute for copper, which was suffering from volatile prices), packaging 
(foil, cans), cycles, appliances, cooking utensils, and decoration. The 
automotive industry, believed to be a major future market for the 
aluminum industry, was certainly a growing customer for Pechiney and 
L‘Aluminium Français (a cartel serving as its sole distributor) in the 1920s, 
with the improvement of aluminum castings.23 While important in the 
                                                   
20 Florence Brachet Champsaur, ―Les dirigeants des Galeries Lafayette,‖ in 
Dictionnaire historique des patrons français, ed. Jean-Claude Daumas et al. 
(Paris, 2010), and Ludovic Cailluet, ―L‘impact de la Première Guerre mondiale et 
le rôle de l‘État dans l‘organisation de la branche et des entreprises,‖ in  
Industrialisation et sociétés en Europe occidentale de la fin du  XIXe siècle à nos 
jours, l'Âge de l'aluminium, ed. Ivan Grinberg and Florence Hachez-Leroy (Paris, 
1997). 
21 Lefeuvre, ―Les lumières de la crise.‖ 
22 Acquisition of several buildings to increase the floor area of the main store on 
boulevard Haussmann in Paris, 1931 general shareholders‘ meeting, records GL. 
From 1934 to 1938, the assets of Galeries Lafayette decreased by 42%, mainly as a 
result of stock exchange prices and the fall in inventory. See evolution of the 
assets in attached data. 
23 Hachez, L’Aluminium Français. 
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mid-1920s (up to 16 percent of total sales), however, the share of 
automotive-related sales decreased in L‘Aluminium Français‘ turnover as 
early as 1928, stabilizing at around 6 percent in 1933.24 
The aluminum industry relied on other customers for its growth, 
particularly through metal used in electrical cables, in the context of the 
massive electrification efforts in rural areas. Defence industries, especially 
from 1934, and also aeronautical industries became the leading customer 
for the industry in the 1930s (aeronautical clients represented 20 percent 
of aluminum and alloys sales in 1930), prevailing over automotive clients. 
Even during the worst phase of the recession in 1932, the Société du 
Duralumin (an alloy manufacturing subsidiary of Pechiney) complained 
that it was not able to serve all orders because of its limited capacity.25  
As a consequence of the penetration of light metals as a substitute for 
copper, thanks to much less volatile prices, and for iron, with equivalent 
strengths and a fraction of the weight, Pechiney steadily increased its 
output between 1922 and 1938, except for a drop in 1931-1933 (see Fig. 
1).26 The  company was  also working very closely during the same period 
Figure 1 
French Production of Aluminum, 1920-1938 
(metric tons)
Source: AF/DE, M. Dupin, Archives Pechiney, 00-1-20026. 
 
                                                   
24 Le marché de l'aluminium, service statistique de L'Aluminium Français. 
Archives Pechiney, 502/I-8-51274. 
25. ―Lutte contre les difficultés économiques,‖ 29 June 1932, p. 5, Archives 
Pechiney, 001-10-20529. 
26 See Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry. 
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with some of its major shareholders and clients, the manufacturers of non-
ferrous metals. That closeness helped Pechiney to switch from a cost-
driven strategy (high volume+low margins in the automotive market) to a 
differentiation strategy (high volume+high value-added products and 
markets in alloys and the aeronautical industry). This strategy, initiated in 
the mid-1920s, was pursued in the late 1920s and the 1930s and served the 
company well when the mass consumption markets collapsed after 1931. 
Pechiney continued its deliveries to specialized customers ready to pay 
higher prices for specific products in short supply such as aluminum 
alloys. The oligopolistic form of the international aluminum industry also 
allowed Pechiney and L‘Aluminium Français, its commercial arm, to 
defend metal prices, which ―only‖ fell by 50 percent between 1929 and 
1935, compared to 70 percent for other metals.27 
During the interwar period, Pechiney was not only active in 
metallurgy; it was a diversified group of companies active in chemicals, 
mining, and energy. As did many other heavy industries, the group thrived 
in the mid-1920s on the development of durable industrial goods and new 
applications for chemicals. Pechiney was, for example, very active in 
trichloroethylene to follow up the growth in the production of Bakelite. 
Since the First World War Pechiney had developed an important 
production capacity in electro-metallurgy. The company had as a conse-
quence launched an ambitious program of investments in order to be self-
sufficient in terms of electricity generation.28 This was done, as in many 
other French groups of the period, through the creation of myriad 
subsidiaries.29 From 1924 to 1933, at least, Pechiney conducted a very 
aggressive strategy of external growth using subsidiaries to enter new 
activities and new geographical markets and to finance the construction of 
dams to produce electricity (see Fig. 2). 
The financial health of Pechiney during the Depression was not bad, 
given that the company was able to pursue some of its investments despite 
three years of reduced production. Dramatic productivity gains were made 
during the Depression. As an illustration, the chemical division in 1935 
realized 98 percent of its 1930 output, with 60 percent of the employees 
and 55 percent of the total salaries in constant money.30 It is important to 
note, however, that the debt load of the group was located primarily with 
its subsidiaries and that, at the time, there was no way to consolidate the 
accounts of the various components of the group.  
 
                                                   
27 Lefevre,―Les lumières de la crise,‖ 39. 
28 Maurice Lévy-Leboyer and Henri Morsel, Histoire de l'électricité en France, 
tome deuxième: 1919-1946 (Paris, 1994), 748. 
29 Didier Bensadon, ―La fièvre des filiales chez AFC (1921-1939),‖ Revue 
Française de gestion 188-189 (2008): 201-18.  
30 From ―Mesures d'économie et de rationalisation,‖ Oct. 1935, Archives 
Pechiney, 001-10-20589. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of Pechiney  Activity Index Compared to the National 
Industrial Production Index 
(100=1928) 
 
Source: author‘s calculations based on Archives Pechiney. 
 
Technological and Managerial Innovations before and during the 
Depression 
The relative decline in aluminum prices started as early as 1929, prior to 
the worst of the Depression in France. This was a clear signal of difficulties 
to come for Pechiney. The first measures were to reduce the labor force.31 
However, a year later, given the extent of the difficulties that were 
foreseen, Pechiney‘s executives Jacques Level and Louis Marlio decided 
upon a large-scale redefinition of production capacity. The company took 
the opportunity to close down obsolete facilities and those considered too 
small to be efficient. These decisions also dramatically reduced the 
logistical costs related to the transportation of goods and materials among 
several plants poorly connected between Alpine valleys.32 In 1933 the 
company created a centralized logistics service to optimize flows between 
units. 
Following a tradition established in the 1880s to develop new 
processes within production plants, Pechiney had from at least 1924 tested 
new generations of electrolysis cells in several of its plants in a pilot 
                                                   
31 Réduction des frais généraux et politique des salaires, 24 Oct. 1931, Archives 
Pechiney, 001-10-20529. 
32 Transportation costs amounted to nearly 10% of the turnover before 1930. 
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program.33 These new technologies were applied to the largest and newest 
plants that remained open during the Depression. As a consequence, when 
production restarted at a strong pace in 1934-1935, the company was 
equipped with much more efficient technologies. It was able to do so also 
because the development budgets related to process improvement were 
never cut during the crisis. Engineers at L‘Argentière and Rioupéroux, two 
smelters located in the French Alps, achieved major technological leaps in 
1930-1934 that led to considerable cost reductions.34 
Shutting down several plants to follow the decrease in aluminum sales, 
Pechiney laid off hundreds of workers. Nevertheless, instructions were 
given whenever possible to retain the most skilled males and all foremen 
in order to restart production without losing expertise when times 
improved. Contrary to most companies, Pechiney maintained salaries for 
its remaining workers at a relatively stable level.35 
Technological prowess was combined with changes in administrative 
methods. The invisible technology of management had also been a concern 
for Pechiney since the early 1920s, in the context of the post-merger 
integration of acquired companies.36 This trend continued right before and 
during the difficulties of the early 1930s. The company established ―anti-
crisis measures‖ by extending pilot experiments conducted with the help 
of American consultant Wallace Clark in 1929 (prior to the Depression) at 
L‘Argentière aluminum plant near Briançon in the southern French Alps. 
Clark‘s system of production cost controls and inventory management, as 
well as a preventive maintenance system, were extended between 1930 
and 1934 to all electro-metallurgy plants.37 Results were spectacular and 
led to very important savings in inventory costs. A central purchasing 
department was established, and the combination of these new practices 
with a specific benchmark effort with competitors provided Pechiney with 
a clear lead after 1934, when production resumed at a pre-1929 rhythm. 
This gave Pechiney a long-term comparative advantage in developing a 
positive attitude among engineers toward management innovation. The 
                                                   
33 Paul Morel, ed., Histoire technique de la production d’aluminium (Paris, 1991), 
and Muriel Le Roux, L'entreprise et la recherche: Un siècle de recherche 
industrielle à Pechiney (Paris, 1998). 
34 Le Roux, L'entreprise et la recherche, 84. 
35 Réduction des frais généraux et politique des salaires, 24 octobre 1931, 
Archives Pechiney, 001-10-20529. 
36 Ludovic Cailluet, ―Accounting and accountants as essential elements in the 
development of central administration during the interwar period: management 
ideology and technology at Alais, Froges et Camargue (AFC-Pechiney),‖ 
Accounting, Business and Finance History 7 (Nov. 1997): 295-314. 
37 ―Contribution à l'étude d'une doctrine relative à l'organisation des ateliers 
d'entretien,‖ Sept. 1933, p. 15, and ―Méthodes d'organisation W. Clarck,‖ 28 Dec. 
1934, p. 12, Archives Pechiney, 00-10-10018 and 10019. 
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young modernists who led the effort were promoted to the Parisian head-
quarters or to broader operational responsibilities.38 
 
Galeries Lafayette: Rationalization and Innovation 
Business historians generally emphasize the innovative role of the 
nineteenth-century department store, sometimes including a dramatic 
image of marketing ―modernity.‖ However, after World War I, retail seems 
to stand in contrast to industry on the key subjects of modernization and 
scientific management. In 1921, for the first time, the Taylor Society 
recommended the extension of scientific management to ―sales 
engineering‖ in the United States. In 1935, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) congress in Paris pointed out the responsibility of archaic 
retailing structures in the economic crisis.39 The importance of distribu-
tion costs in the retail price was cited to explain the fall in consumption. 
The reduction of production costs had not been followed by a correspond-
ing reduction in retailing costs, which on the contrary increased. From 
1930 to 1936, there was a 25 percent drop in wholesale prices and a 20 
percent drop in retail prices.40 The turnover of Galeries Lafayette started 
decreasing in August 1930 (see Fig. 3).41 In current French francs, the fall 
was even deeper than the decline in the retail price index. Nevertheless, 
thanks to the gap between wholesale and retail prices, one year later, in 
1931, the gross margin increased by one percent.42  
In the international discussion about distribution‘s responsibility in 
the crisis, France was specially criticized because of the very high market 
share of small retailers: 92.65 percent in 1906 and still 88.77 percent in 
1936. In this context, department stores were expected to play the 
essential role in modernizing retail in France. The interwar period is the 
beginning of a new epoch for department stores in which they 
experimented with important changes in their business model. The 
founding concept of low margins and high turnover hardly fit with the 
increasing range of goods on offer and the new services for customers.  
Drapery long remained the core business of most stores. The so-called 
novelty stores gathered under one roof all the goods for women‘s apparel 
and accessories (fabrics, ribbons, laces, hats, umbrellas, corsets, hosiery, 
                                                   
38Ludovic Cailluet, ―Pratique et diffusion des méthodes modernes d‘organisation 
et de contrôle de gestion: Le parcours exemplaire de Jean Benoit chez Pechiney 
de 1925 à 1962,‖ in Les grands auteurs en contrôle de gestion, ed. H. Bouquin 
(Paris, 2005), 284-300. 
39 On this subject see Laurence Badel, Un milieu libéral et européen: Le grand 
commerce français, 1925-1948 (Paris, 1999), 217-30. 
40 Alfred Sauvy, Histoire économique de la France entre les deux guerres, 3 vols. 
(Paris, 1965), 3: 351 and 356. 
41 Board Meeting report, 28 Jan. 1931, records GL. From 1931 to 1938, the 
turnover of Galeries Lafayette decreased by 48% in constant French francs. 
42 Board Meeting report, 10 June 1931, records GL. 
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dresses, and so forth). But while those shops had become larger, 
department stores introduced a wider variety of products. Besides the 
traditional apparel, accessories, and textile departments, new merchandise 
lines appeared such as home furnishings, carpets, stationery, jewelry, 
bedding, and photography. At Galeries Lafayette, the number of 
departments increased from 86 in 1906 to 93 in 1908, and to 108 in 1913 
after major extensions of the building on boulevard Haussmann.43 In 
1932, the main Galeries Lafayette store in Paris had 172 departments. 
 
Figure 3  
Assets and Turnover of Galeries Lafayette, 1919-1939 
(in million Francs [constant]) 
 
 
 
Because of the tendency toward increased competition among depart-
ment stores, the emphasis began to shift from prices to services.44 Added 
to the growth in the department stores‘ expenses for advertising and sales 
promotions, the cost of services increased total overhead. In a context of 
intensive competition, the stores largely focused on sales promotions, with 
a detrimental effect on the margin.  
Retailers are often seen as short-term–oriented managers. In the 
words of one commentator: 
 
                                                   
43 Archives Galeries Lafayette. 
44 In the term of services, DS mainly focused on delivery facilities. In the early 
1900s, Galeries Lafayette had a regular motor delivery service between Paris and 
Trouville for their customers on holidays according to Pierre Moride, Les 
maisons à succursales multiples en France et à l’étranger (Paris, 1913), 63. 
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The world of department stores seems to be in many respects the 
world of ephemeral, and this has exercised an influence on the 
atmosphere of the department store and on the outlook of his top 
managers. There is perforce a natural tendency to be concerned 
with the immediate rather than with the more distant, and this is 
not a situation most suitable for executive selection and building.45 
However, the top executives of the European department stores were 
aware of their need to try out new ideas. In the case of Galeries Lafayette, 
Theophile Bader carefully selected his two sons-in-law to introduce a 
change in the management of the firm. Raoul Meyer and Max Heilbronn 
were, respectively, graduates of business and engineering schools. 
For the purpose of interchanging facts and ideas through meetings 
with their peers, the department store holders soon set up business 
associations. In 1919, Galeries Lafayette was one of the eight founding 
members of the GEGM (Groupement d‘Etude des Grands Magasins), 
which was designed to act as a source of information on economics, trade, 
and the tax system.46 
In the modernization of French and European department stores, one 
cannot downplay the decisive role of international associations and foreign 
colleagues. After the First World War, innovation came no longer from 
Europe, but from the United States.47 Business studies trips began to 
multiply. Max Heilbronn, Theophile Bader‘s son-in-law, chose to visit 
America in 1926 during his honeymoon. In March 1929, both Raoul Meyer 
and Max Heilbronn asked their U.S. colleague Edgar J. Kaufmann to build 
an itinerary for a journey to review the most representative American 
department stores.  
Back from an official mission to the United States, Emile Bernheim, 
director of the Belgian department store L‘Innovation, modernized his 
own store according to the American methods, creating research and 
training departments as well as a budgetary control system. But he was 
also convinced of the important role played by the American Retail 
Research Association, which had existed in the United States since 1927, 
and he set up a European equivalent upon his return.48 The research 
organization (Groupement d‘études) focused on the improvement of 
working methods in the department stores. Research started with Ragnar 
Sachs and Pierre Laguionie, respectively heads of the Nordiska Kompaniet 
                                                   
45 Henry Pasdermadjian, quoted in Donald K. Bekley, ―Identifying problems of 
human relations in retailing,‖ Journal of Marketing 20 (July 1955): 51-53. 
46 Its initial main concern was to fight, through lobbying, the 1919 law, which 
introduced the 8-hour working day. 
47 See Emmanuel Chadeau, ―Le commerce de détail: entreprises et ‗révolutions 
commerciales‘,‖ Entreprises et histoire 4 (1993): 3-13. 
48 In the interwar period, the formative practice of critical store visits was 
imported from the United States by European department store associations; see 
David Carson, ―Critical store visits,‖ Journal of Marketing 18 (Oct. 1953): 134-37. 
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and Le Printemps. Joined by the German Tietz, the Dutch De Bijenkorf, 
the Danish Magasin du Nord, the Italian Rinascente, and the Spanish El 
Siglo, this first professional group transformed into the international 
association AIGM (Association Internationale des Grands Magasins) in 
1931.49 The head office was located in Paris at Le Printemps. 
 
Scientific management at work 
Galeries Lafayette first introduced scientific organization in its production 
plant. The integration of an important manufacturing activity had been 
one of the key factors in Galeries Lafayette‘s success, especially for 
garments, making it more reactive to the changes in fashion. In 1916, the 
firm created an industrial subsidiary, the SPC (Société Parisienne de 
Confection) to centralize the existing workshops. In 1921, the managers 
inaugurated a new building in Paris specially designed ―to produce 
garments according to the American scientific industrial organization.‖50  
In a second step, the introduction of new organizational structures led to 
the creation of independent purchasing departments. Historically, the 
department stores had been founded on the innovative idea of gathering 
under one roof a variety of items to provide a more efficient shopping 
experience. Until the interwar period, department stores were organized 
as a federation of retailers, each department being responsible for both 
sales and purchases. 
 In 1929, Galeries Lafayette set up a new branch, the SPAM (Société 
Parisienne d‘Achat et de Manutention, for purchasing, logistics, and 
warehousing), an independent company directed by Gaston Lehmann. 
This new purchasing organization was to assume the activity of the 
wholesale buying offices already located in Paris, Lyon, Saint-Etienne, 
Elbeuf, Roubaix, and London.51 Galeries Lafayette had already concluded 
an agreement in 1919 with the Cordeliers store in Lyon to assist with  
buying activity for Galeries Lafayette in exchange for a 5 percent 
commission on the total amount of the order.52 The aim of this structure 
was above all to separate sales and purchasing and to give the buyers 
autonomy in their job. Under the integrated model of Galeries Lafayette, 
SPAM was to be the new partner of the SPC in the purchasing process for 
the stores. This was a real revolution in the organization of Galeries 
Lafayette; during the board meetings, the executive managers regularly 
called the department administrators to order, reminding them that sales 
heads should no longer meet the purchasing agents. The sales managers 
were also invited to provide SPAM with more effective and coherent 
information on the sell-through of their items. 
                                                   
49 Badel, Un milieu libéral et européen, 211. 
50 ―Les Annexes des Magasins des Galeries Lafayette,‖ L'Architecture 25 (Sept. 
1921): 41. 
51 Archives GL. 
52 AG du 29 Nov. 1919, archives GL. 
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The building of the independent buying offices is closely linked with 
the introduction of scientific methods of stock and account management. 
In 1931, Paul Planus, a well-known consulting engineer, started working 
for Galeries Lafayette.53 He took the opportunity of the reorganization of 
the garage and its repair shop to introduce an inventory accounting 
system. He also set up a standards office to centralize information.54 In 
1932, through the reorganization of the warehouse, Planus extended  
inventory accounting to the whole department store in order to improve 
the buying system and reduce the amount of stock.55  
In 1932 Galeries Lafayette also set up a supplementary central 
purchasing organization called Société Centrale d‘Achats (SCA). This 
organization was to deal mainly with independent suppliers. The first 
retailer who became an affiliated member of the SCA opened a store in 
Rouen in October 1932 under the NOMA brand.  
 
The new Monoprix chain stores, 1932 
The scientific management of  purchasing operations played a decisive role 
in the development of a new retail concept in France from 1928 to 1929: 
the price-point chain stores. France was quite late in the introduction of 
such stores, mainly inspired by Woolworth‘s 5&10, and already developed 
in the United Kingdom by Marks & Spencer and in Germany in its most 
successful form by Ehape (Tietz) and Epa (Karstadt).56 
Nouvelles Galeries opened the first French price-point or variety store 
chain under the brand ―Uniprix‖ in 1928. The establishment of the 
―Prisunic‖ chain by Le Printemps in 1931 was rapidly followed by 
―Monoprix‖ by Galeries Lafayette and eventually ―Priminime‖ by Le Bon 
Marché in 1932. 
This new form of large-scale retailing, catering to the working and 
middle classes, used price as its main appeal. The price ranges, generally 
limited to three, depended on limiting the goods on offer. In 1935, 4,500 
items were available at Prisunic, compared to 90,000 at Le Printemps.57 
Goods were divided into twenty to thirty departments. The best sellers 
were basics such as artificial silk stockings, cotton shirts, eaus de toilette, 
household soaps, or pitchers. Price-point stores concentrated on basics 
                                                   
53 Paul Planus set up an independent study in Paris in 1929 to help the firms 
reorganize according to Taylor‘s theories. In 1933, he spent eight days at the 
American department store Macy‘s, in order to provide recommendations to 
improve the supply management of Galeries Lafayette. See Moutet, Les logiques 
de l’entreprise, 211.  
54 Réorganisation du garage des Galeries Lafayette (Geneva, 1933), quoted in 
Moutet, Les logiques de l’entreprise. 
55 Les magasins de réserve des Galeries Lafayette, Centre de Préparation aux 
Affaires (CPA) (Paris, 1932). 
56 Badel, Un milieu libéral et européen, 71-89. 
57 ―Les magasins à prix uniques,‖ Bulletin CPA, 1 Jan. 1935, p.11. 
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and staple goods that could be mass produced. These chains were usually 
not producers, thus avoiding a higher tax.58 The display of the products 
was rudimentary. They were put together into boxes by price instead of by 
range of product, a tactic that also disguised somewhat the lack of variety. 
Products were not even labelled, and color codes were used to mark 
the price. The role of the lower-qualified sales staff was almost reduced to 
serving as cashiers. As a consequence, wages were 20 percent lower than 
in a department store. Services were nonexistent, as goods could not be 
home-delivered or returned.59 Consumer credit was banned. While 
department stores took responsibility for increasing their advertising 
budgets, the price-point stores relied on their cheaper prices to spread  
their reputation. Because of their highly rationalized organization, the 
price-point chain stores managed to lower the cost of sales to 25 percent of 
the turnover, compared to an average 33 percent in a department store. 
In 1937, a survey by the Federation of Multiple-Shop Retailers 
(Fédération nationale des entreprises à commerces multiples, FNECM) 
highlighted the accuracy of the statistics communicated by the price-point 
stores compared to specialty chain stores or even department stores. The 
three price-point store chains answering the survey were able to provide 
data on ―sales volume and average output, consumption fluctuations in 
quantity and quality, purchase-elasticity in a context of price increases 
with a breakdown of products, consumer insights . . . .‖60 
In a 1933 conference, the grocery trade union had already pinpointed 
the modernity of the price-point stores‘ management tools in contrast to 
the backwardness of the local independent retailers, who were unable to 
work out their costs.61 According to their unfortunate competitors, the 
chain store managers were very good at finding the lower cost price items 
with high sales potential in each range of product. Their knowledge of such 
business data was also a strong point in negotiating with suppliers.  
Based on the chronology of the openings, we could say that the French 
concept of price-point store was not directly linked to the economic crisis. 
However, the evolution of the economic background in Europe from 1931 
certainly influenced the proliferation of these stores.  
Galeries Lafayette, which was not the first entrant in this emerging 
retail concept, first considered the price-point chain stores as a new 
competitor. In March 1931, a ―price-point‖ range of products was intro-
                                                   
58 The production tax introduced in 1936 (6% of the cost price) rose to 8% in 1937 
and penalized manufacturer-retailers. 
59 In the same period, home delivery service represented 4% of operating costs in 
department stores. 
60 Enquête sur la production, 1937, archives Fédération nationale des entreprises 
à commerces multiples. 
61 ―Les magasins à prix uniques,‖ 30ème congrès de la Fédération Française des 
syndicats de l‘épicerie, Rouen 19-21 June 1933, archives Chambre Syndicale des 
Magasins Populaires. 
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duced at Galeries Lafayette. In a board meeting in February 1932, the 
management insisted on the necessity of fighting the competition of these 
retailers, including by selling a range of price-point products in the 
department store. They took the opportunity of the sales period of summer 
1932 to introduce more items and a special display.62 But, to avoid mixing 
up the department store with a price-point store, the administrators finally 
decided to use the phrase prix arrondis (―rounding-off prices‖) with a 
price list of 10, 15, and 20 French francs. This happened before the 
opening of the first Monoprix store. With their new chain store, the 
managers of Galeries Lafayette rapidly understood the value of entering 
this market segment with a separate store brand. In doing so, they turned 
the threat of this competition into a commercial success. These stores 
rapidly spread out, and only six months after the opening of the first 
Monoprix, Théophile Bader was able to forecast a network of twenty-seven 
stores with a 625 million franc turnover for September 1933.63 However, 
after a few more years, Galeries Lafayette itself tried to attract the 
customers looking for low-price items. From 1932 to 1936, corporate 
communications emphasized price with this catch phrase: ―Acheter aux 
Galeries Lafayette c‘est faire des économies‖ / ― Buying at Galeries 
Lafayette is saving up.‖ 
This product mix helped establish synergy between Galeries Lafayette 
and Monoprix. Only four days after the opening of the first Monoprix in 
October 1932, the executive committee encouraged the department heads 
at Galeries Lafayette to buy from the supplying office of the price-point 
stores set up next door, on the boulevard Haussmann.64 More surprising, 
the Monoprix could also resupply from Galeries Lafayette, directly in the 
Parisian store, and was charged at cost.65 
These buying processes demonstrate that Galeries Lafayette and 
Monoprix had similar basic items on offer. Both shared the same central 
buying office, SCA. In so doing, they joined their orders and, because of 
the significant quantities, were in a strong position to deal with the 
manufacturers. In 1935 Max Heilbronn, who had taken advice from Simon 
Marks (of Marks & Spencer fame), had mass produced 100,000 similar 
shirts and 500,000 aprons.66 He applied himself to building long-term 
good relationships with suppliers, as for instance with Pierre Levy, the 
famous manager of the industrial knitting firm Devanlay-Recoing.  
Nevertheless, Galeries Lafayette was also catering to the upper classes. 
                                                   
62 Board meeting, report, 3 June 1932. 
63 Letter from Théophile Bader to M. Gunthert (CCF), 21 April 1933, Noma, 
archives GL. 
64 Board meeting, report, 28 Oct. 1932. 
65 Board meeting, report, 28 July 1933. 
66 ―Les magasins populaires,‖ in Paris-Couture-années trente (Exhibition 
Catalogue, Musee de la Mode et du Costume), ed. Guillaume Garnier (Paris, 
1987), 215. 
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In 1933, they published a luxury products catalogue. At the same time, the 
management of Galeries Lafayette decided that the utility goods should 
not be advertised, either in the catalogues or in the layout of the store.67 It 
is true that the introduction of a range of low-price items was made at the 
expense of quality at Galeries Lafayette. For instance, in 1930 a flagship 
fabric called ―zenana‖ was made of silk, and sold at a price of 54.9 francs in 
a width of 1.10m. In 1933, the so-called zenana was sold at a price of 25.9 
francs. The general price decline occurring since 1932 was not the only 
reason for this reduction; in 1933 the fabric had become a mix of silk and 
wool and its width had been reduced to 0.80m. 
At the turn of 1935, the management of Galeries Lafayette understood 
that they had neglected the traditional department store clientele, the 
middle and higher income classes. In 1936, the managers decided that the 
forthcoming catalogue would be produced in a more luxurious style and 
would present items of good taste.68 The sense of quality made its 
comeback in a new catch phrase: ―Aux Galeries Lafayette, l‘économie par 
la qualité‖ / ―At Galeries Lafayette, savings through quality.‖ 
In this repositioning strategy, the Monoprix chain stores were of great 
utility. They allowed Galeries Lafayette to clarify its brand image but to 
cater at the same time to both the working and the upper classes. 
In fact, most of the ―five-and-ten‖ chain stores in France during the 
1930s were founded by department stores. This new retail concept offered 
a way to adjust to market segmentation and offered a more suitable vehicle 
for expanding the department stores‘ network in the provinces. Their 
cheaper positioning targeted the working-class customers who could not 
afford to buy in the upgraded department stores. This market segmenta-
tion was a new practice that helped department stores build a more 
accurate customer target in a context of strong competition. 
 
A better position resulting from the strong competition among Parisian 
department stores 
In that context, prices were not enough: new services (such as deliveries), 
new departments, and new improvements were offered to highly desired 
customers. More advertising was done, and overhead expenditures 
increased, reducing operating margins. The introduction of this new retail 
concept thus is an answer to the fall in purchasing power resulting from 
the crisis, but it is also a result of a long-term evolution of the department 
stores away from their first business model based on low prices, high 
volumes, and low margins—―vendre beaucoup à petit bénéfice,‖ in the 
words of Le Bon Marché founder Aristide Boucicaut.  
As French department stores began transforming into general stores, 
the narrowing of the goods and the careful restriction of the number of 
references sold in the price-point chain stores could be interpreted as back 
                                                   
67 Board meeting, report, 13 Jan. 1933, records GL. 
68 Board meeting, report, 17 Jan. 1936, records GL. 
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to basics: le commerce de la nouveauté, novelty trade. It is also a response 
to a new competition emerging during the 1920s from chain-store 
companies that specialized in dress and footwear. This new form of large-
scale retailing, catering to the popular and middle classes, used price as 
the main appeal, whereas traditional department stores, catering to the 
middle and higher income classes, used quality and services.  
 
From innovation in distribution to administrative innovation 
At a 1933 conference, as described earlier, the grocery trade union had 
already pinpointed the modernity of the management tools of the price-
point stores, in contrast to the backwardness of the local independent 
retailers unable to work out their cost prices.69 In 1937, a survey from the 
FNECM highlighted the accuracy of the statistics communicated by the 
price-point stores compared to specialty chain stores or even department 
stores.70 The combination of the economic crisis and innovations in 
distribution led to improvements in the management of the retail groups, 
exactly as the anti-crisis measures at Pechiney had provided an 
opportunity for modernists to impose their views on adopting new 
methods and new indicators. These innovations were not to remain only 
circumstantial but were to endure and be developed in the 1940s and 
later.71 
 
Conclusion 
There are certainly many limitations in our choices of Pechiney and 
Galeries Lafayette as cases. The first and most obvious is that both 
companies survived the Depression and endured for a very long time 
thereafter: until the present as an independent company for Galeries 
Lafayette; Pechiney was taken over by Canadian aluminum producer Alcan 
in 2003. Hundreds of corporations went bankrupt during the period, and 
this led to a reinforcement of the market position of the strongest players 
in their respective industries. 
These factors do not, however, support the uniqueness of these two 
firms. It has been shown that during the Great Depression, many firms 
among the largest fared relatively well in terms of asset value.72 This is a 
story of victors and resilience. These companies were favoured by the 
existence of cartels and oligopolistic competition, among other factors. 
Finally, this is a history of long-term strategizing favored by not-too-
demanding shareholders and stable managers in the continental style. 
                                                   
69 ―Les magasins à prix uniques,‖ 30ème congrès de la Fédération Française des 
syndicats de l‘épicerie. 
70 Enquête sur la production, 1937. 
71 Cailluet, ―Pratique et diffusion des méthodes modernes d‘organisation et de 
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72 Lefeuvre, ―Les lumières de la crise.‖  
Champsaur and Cailluet // Periodization in French Business History 21 
   
In looking at case studies, business historians do not help much in 
building generalizations; however, they participate in creating a history of 
decision-making. They also provide economic historians with examples 
that contradict—or more precisely, provide nuance—in the depiction of 
important episodes of the past. 
